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Introduction 
Few constructs rest more securely upon the foundation of rhetorical theory than the 
syllogism. Introduced by Aristotle in the fourth century BC, the syllogism provided Athenian 
orators with structural guidance for constructing valid, deductive arguments in the polis 
(Aristotle, 1991, 40; Aristotle, 1984a; Aristotle, 1984b). Yet this guidance is not without 
qualification: Often neglected in modern times is the fact that valid conclusions, for Aristotle, 
were only expected to follow necessarily from the premises when the audience was comprised of 
men acting in accordance with orthos logos, or "right reason" (1984c, 1935-36; 1984d, 1766, 
1797, 1798, 1808, 1812, 1819). Also neglected in modern times is the fact that Aristotle thought 
of "right reason" as a developed ability that "comes to us if growth is allowed to proceed 
regularly" rather than as an innate aspect of human cognition (1984c, 1939-40). When such 
growth does proceed regularly, the prudent man, replete with a sort of cultural wisdom and 
acting in accordance with orthos logos, emerges (1984d, 1748). Put more generally, then, the 
validity of Aristotle's syllogism rests not upon a bedrock of universal logic but upon the 
intersubjective agreement of the enculturated Athenian citizens of his time. 
Furthering the case for culture in the study of cognition is the Russian psychologist 
Alexander Luria, who, in The Making of Mind, noted considerable variation in syllogistic 
reasoning among the remote villagers of Uzbekistan and Khirgizia. Although the villagers were 
adept at reasoning from practical experience, Luria concluded that they were unable to infer 
syllogistically for the following reasons: 
The first was a mistrust of initial premises that did not arise out of their personal 
experience. This made it impossible for them to use such premises as a point of 
departure. Second, they failed to accept such premises as universal. Rather, they treated 
them as a particular statement reflecting a particular phenomenon. Third, as a result of 
these two factors, the syllogisms disintegrated into three isolated, particular propositions 
with no unified logic, and they had no way in which to channel thought into the system. . 
. . Although our nonliterate peasant groups could use logical relations objectively if they 
could rely on their own experience, we can conclude that they had not acquired the 
syllogism as a device for making logical inferences. (1979, 79-80; my emphasis) 
                                                 
1 The development of this paper is sufficiently strange to warrant a brief explanation: As I finished my 
Gentnerian analysis of Hantaro Nagaoka's Saturnian theory of atomic structure in the spring of 1998, I was left with 
the unsettling feeling that I had somehow failed to articulate the aspects of Gentner's theory that made it so uniquely 
appealing. Yet I published the analysis nonetheless (Little, 2000). Only after attending Charles Bazerman's 
sociocultural learning theory course two years later did I begin to understand those unique aspects of Gentner's 
theory in the light of cultural variation, and I published this realization shortly thereafter (Little, forthcoming). This 
present paper, then, only represents my attempt to (1) synthesize those fragmented thoughts and findings from my 
previously published work, and (2) re-present my thinking and analysis in a more coherent and complete fashion 
today. 
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A comparison of this work to that of Aristotle's reveals a remarkable difference in cultural 
underpinnings: Whereas "right reason" ensured a tacit fluency in syllogistic reasoning among the 
enculturated Athenian citizens of Aristotle's time, the developmental histories of Luria's peasants 
provided them with a functional set of literate practices in which the syllogism was nowhere to 
be found. Cultural inheritance, then, seems to account best for these sorts of differences in 
reasoning practices as well as for the highly stabilized presence of the syllogism in Western 
cognitive activity, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. 
Today, we seem to overlook the importance of cultural variation in our own work and, 
instead, project the latent assumption that fundamental cognitive processes, such as syllogistic 
and analogical reasoning, are universal properties of human cognition. In this paper, I attempt to 
address this issue of cultural variation by sketching a sociocultural path for future studies of 
analogy. I begin by reviewing a sample of the rhetoric of science literature to illustrate our 
present tendency to treat analogy as a universal cognitive device. Afterward, I draw briefly from 
social scientific research that shows notable cases of cultural variation in analogical reasoning, 
before introducing Lev Vygotsky's concept of internalization and Dedre Gentner's structure 
mapping theory of analogy as fruitful theoretical and methodological means by which to 
examine more effectively, and with improved cultural sensitivity, the role of analogical 
reasoning in science. Finally, I offer my own Gentnerian analysis of the role of analogical 
reasoning in Hantaro Nagaoka's Saturnian theory of atomic structure as an example of the sort of 
work enabled by Gentner's theory. 
Treating Analogy as a Universal Cognitive Device 
That rhetoricians of science treat analogy as a universal cognitive device owes at least in 
part to the macroscopic conception of analogy inherent in their approach (Little, 2000, 69). By 
treating analogy as an ossified device that operates in a collective way, rhetoricians tend to focus 
their attention solely on the varying rhetorical effects of analogy, which eclipses from critical 
examination the possibility of cultural variation in the interpretation of the analogy itself. In 
short, the macroscopic conception of analogy lacks the "resolving power" necessary to identify 
differences that exist across cultures or within cultures over time. 
To illustrate this point, consider the work of Alan Gross: "[A]nalogy," he explains, "has had 
a long history in the sciences. An important device in Aristotle's scientific writing, it is still very 
much in use today: the concept of the genetic code is a scientific analogy" (1996, 22). Gross then 
examines the function of analogy in the political oration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 
scholarly debate between Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, and the scientific theorizing of Francis 
Crick and company to show that analogy functions differently in each domain, representing 
different disciplinary communication strategies (1996, 21-32). However, nowhere in the analysis 
was the analogy itself dissected and examined; what is more, insofar as Gross remains indebted 
to a macroscopic conception of analogy, he is unable to do otherwise. Because his conception of 
analogy lacks a sufficient level of methodological granularity, he is virtually forced to tacitly 
assume that analogy is a universal device, perhaps used differently in different contexts, but 
interpretively stable over culture and time. 
Indeed, analogy has had a long history in the sciences. But how do we know that the analogy 
of Aristotle's day approximates the analogy of today, that is, that analogy has been interpreted 
uniformly over the history of science and across the three domains of interest to Gross? In fact, 
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as rhetoricians of science, we do not, and therein lies the latent assumption of interpretive 
invariance, or universality. 
Similarly, in his work on the Origin of Species, John Angus Campbell investigated Darwin's 
domestic breeder-natural selection analogy insofar as it served Darwin's supposed strategy of 
portraying natural selection through everyday language. But again, at no time throughout his 
work (1974; 1975; 1986; 1989; 1995) does Campbell disassemble the cardinal analogy of natural 
selection and ask what the audience might have construed as logical consequences of the 
constituent correspondences individually. Without such work, we are left to our imaginations 
when understanding the set of candidate inferences the analogy was likely to suggest to Darwin's 
Victorian society, to Darwin's proximate audience, and to Darwin himself, or to detect any 
variation in analogical inference across these domains. 
In neuroscience, the tendency remains the same. Edwin Clark and L. S. Jacyna examine the 
heuristic role of several analogies within neuroanatomy and neurophysiology in Nineteenth-
Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts. Here, we learn of the paradigm shift effected by 
the encephalon-spinal cord analogy, which not only interjected the term "ganglion" into 
cerebrospinal terminology but also recast the brain as a "conglomeration of ganglia" (1987, 31). 
This set the stage for Franz Gall and Caspar Spurzheim's attempt to unify all vertebrates under 
the ganglion concept through an analogy between ganglion system growth and plant system 
growth (1987, 36, 45). Clark and Jacyna also tell the story of Gustav Valentin and Jan Purkyne's 
"imaginative leap" by analogy to show that ciliary motion, which was known to occur on the 
external surfaces of invertebrates, also occurs inside vertebrates, particularly on the ventricles of 
the brain (1987, 66). However, like Gross and Campbell, Clark and Jacyna resist detailed 
explication: Rather than disassemble the driving analogies in their subject, they approach them 
macroscopically, which precludes from examination the possibility of cultural variation. 
Toward a Culturally Sensitive Approach to Analogy in Science 
If analogical reasoning did not admit of cultural variation with respect to interpretation, then 
a universal conception of analogy, which the macroscopic approach seems to suggest, would be 
appropriate, even ideal. However, such is not the case: In Andrew Ortony's anthology Metaphor 
and Thought, for example, Dedre Gentner and Michael Jeziorski acknowledge the sociocultural 
variation in analogical reasoning through their examination of its dramatic shift in interpretation 
in 17th-century chemistry: 
The alchemists relied heavily on similarity and metaphor in their investigations of the 
nature of matter; but their use of similarity differed sharply from that of modern 
scientists. In particular, the alchemists lacked a sense that analogy in the modern sense 
had any advantage over surface similarity or over metonymic, richly interconnected but 
unclarified forms of similarity and metaphor. . . . The marked difference in the style of 
analogizing between the alchemists and later scientists suggests that the uses of analogy 
and similarity are in part culturally defined. (1993, 475) 
Even more pertinent is Gentner's finding that literary communities are more accepting of 
nonclarified similarity than are scientific communities. Likewise, Shen (in Gentner and Jeziorski, 
1993, 476) has argued that the rich, many-to-one mappings of literary metaphor are met with 
skepticism in modern scientific discourse, where clarified, one-to-one correspondences are 
preferred. 
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What, then, can account for the relative stability of analogical interpretation within 
individual discourse communities (e.g., modern physics or English literature) while 
simultaneously acknowledging its instability across communities (e.g., physics compared to 
English literature) and across time (e.g., alchemy compared to modern chemistry)? If 
rhetoricians of science are to begin to orient themselves toward such cultural contingencies, then 
attending to these fundamental questions seems the most appropriate place to begin. To do so, I 
turn to Lev Vygotsky and Dedre Gentner for theoretical and methodological assistance. 
Vygotsky's Concept of Internalization 
Vygotsky's concept of internalization is best understood within the context of language 
development in children. Unlike Jean Piaget, who conceived of language as originating in the 
individual and proceeding outward toward social interaction, Vygotsky reversed the trajectory of 
development: "The primary function of speech," Vygotsky explains, "in both children and adults, 
is communication, social contact. The earliest speech of the child is therefore essentially social" 
(1986, 34-35). For Vygotsky, language develops in response to social pressures; presumably, 
children realize their dependence upon the services of their caregivers, and any system of 
gestures, symbols, or cries that facilitates receipt of those services will do. Over time, children 
and caregivers negotiate a mutually acceptable system of language, predominantly oral, through 
which to interact, and it is within this interaction that the origin of socialization lies. 
At some later point in the development process, children begin to use their language of 
social interaction for personal activity; when confronted with a problem, for example, they begin 
to talk to themselves, that is, they begin to engage in egocentric speech. This form of speech does 
not merely accompany personal activity; rather, it directs it, becoming "an instrument of thought 
in the proper sense--in seeking and planning the solution of a problem" (1986, 31). Echoing the 
ontological relativism of Edward Sapir, Vygotsky remarks: 
By means of words children single out separate elements, thereby overcoming the natural 
structure of the sensory field and forming new (artificially introduced and dynamic) 
structural centers. The child begins to perceive the world not only through his eyes but 
also through his speech. As a result, the immediacy of "natural" perception is supplanted 
by a complex mediated process. . . . (1978a, 32) 
Still later in the development process, egocentric speech diminishes and ultimately 
disappears altogether; however, again in stark contrast to Piaget, Vygotsky insists that egocentric 
speech does not merely atrophy but "goes underground" to form the condensed language of inner 
speech, which continues throughout adulthood in shaping thought and subsequent action (1986, 
33). This entire process of internalization, from social to egocentric to inner speech, is one that 
Vygotsky does not take lightly: 
The greatest change in children's capacity to use language as a problem-solving tool takes 
place somewhat later in their development, when socialized speech (which has previously 
been used to address an adult) is turned inward. Instead of appealing to the adult, 
children appeal to themselves; language thus takes on an intrapersonal function in 
addition to its interpersonal use. When children develop a method of behavior for 
guiding themselves that had previously been used in relation to another person, when 
they organize their own activities according to a social form of behavior, they succeed in 
applying a social attitude to themselves. The history of the process of internalization of 
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social speech is also the history of the socialization of children's practical intellect. 
(1978b, 27) 
The implications of the social origins of inner speech are paramount when we consider the 
relation between language and thought that Vygotsky held. Language, for Vygotsky, is the 
primary prerequisite for conceptual thought; it is the conceptual quality of the word that mediates 
our sensory perceptions of the immediate moment to enable a "generalized reflection of reality" 
(1986, 6). This frees us from the immediate moment both visually and temporally. According to 
Vygotsky, language enables children to reorganize and reconstruct their visual perception, thus 
"freeing themselves from the given structure of the [visual] field" (1986, 35). He continues: 
With the help of the indicative function of words, the child begins to master his attention, 
creating new structural centers in the perceived situation. As K. Koffka so aptly put it, the 
child is able to determine for herself the "center of gravity" of her perceptual field. 
(1978a, 36)  
Visual perception aside, language also enables children to construct a temporal continuum 
from past through present to future. This enables the child to "view changes in his immediate 
situation from the point of view of past activities, and he can act in the present form from the 
viewpoint of the future" (1978a, 36). Vygotsky continues: 
Through verbal formulations of past situations and activities, the child frees himself from 
the limitations of direct recall; he succeeds in synthesizing the past and present to suit his 
purposes. The changes that occur in memory are similar to those that occur in the child's 
perceptual field where centers of gravity are shifted and figure and ground relationship 
are altered. The child's memory not only makes fragments of the past more available, but 
also results in a new method of uniting the elements of past experience with the present. 
(1978a, 36)  
It is through this conceptual reflection of reality, acquired through the internalization of 
social discourse, that we acquire such cognitive processes as syllogistic and analogical reasoning. 
What constitutes a valid interpretation of analogy in a given time or place, then, is culturally 
inherited through the tacit structures of the ambient discourse of that time or place, from infant 
caregiving through primary, secondary, and advanced schooling. To communicate as infants, we 
must adhere, to some degree, to the local norms for symbolic activity, which we, in time, turn 
inward as tools for our own problem-solving activities. Yet the process does not stop there: To 
communicate as adult members of a particular discourse community, we must adhere, to some 
degree, to the local norms for symbolic activity as well, which we, in time, turn inward as tools 
for our own problem-solving activities. And therein lies the sociocultural origins of analogical 
reasoning, which explains, at least conceptually, the relative stability of analogical interpretation 
within individual discourse communities while simultaneously acknowledging its instability 
across communities and across time. 
To the extent that rhetoricians of science wish to investigate such variation in interpretation, 
they are unable to do with without incorporating a more socioculturally sensitive theory of 
analogy that is capable of detecting the nuanced differences in analogical interpretation. To this 
end, I suggest Dedre Gentner's structure mapping theory of analogy. 
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Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory of Analogy 
Under the rubric of social science research on analogical reasoning exists a substantial and 
active body of literature dedicated to the selection process by which correspondences between 
the base and target domain of an analogy are established, that is, the ways in which analogies are 
"drawn." This scholarship is unified and catalyzed by a fundamental fact, well known within the 
field: in every analogy between two domains, each containing m predicates and n attributes, lay 
m!n! potential correspondences—similarities that could be mapped from the base to the target 
domain during the process of analogical reasoning. "Thus," explain Holyoak and Thagard (1989, 
298), "a typical analogy between analogs with 10 predicates and 5 [attributes] each generates 
over 400 million possible mappings"—assuming that predicates map only to predicates and 
attributes only to attributes in a one-to-one fashion. Because analogical reasoning is not nearly as 
arbitrary as the m!n! rule predicts, cognitive psychologists assume that a set of constraints must 
govern this selection process, and it is precisely their attempt to codify these constraints that 
drives their research. 
Gentner's structure mapping theory of analogy represents one of the most prominent theories 
of analogy in the cognitive psychology literature, one that has enjoyed a considerable amount of 
attention since its 1983 inception. Aiming in part to "capture . . . the descriptive constraints that 
characterize the interpretation of analogy and similarity" (Gentner and Jeziorski, 1993, 448, 
450), the structure mapping theory sets forth six principles that guide the process of analogical 
reasoning: 
1) Structural consistency. Objects are placed in one-to-one correspondence and 
parallel connectivity in predicates is maintained. 
2) Relational focus. Relational systems are preserved and object descriptions 
disregarded. 
3) Systematicity. Among various relational interpretations, the one with the greatest 
depth—that is, the greatest degree of common higher-order relational structure—
is preferred. 
4) No extraneous associations. Only commonalities strengthen an analogy. Further 
relations and associations between the base and target—for example, thematic 
connections—do not contribute to the analogy. 
5) No mixed analogies. The relational network to be mapped should be entirely 
contained within one base domain. When two bases are used, they should each 
convey a coherent system. 
6) Analogy is not causation. That two phenomena are analogous does not imply that 
one causes the other. 
The purely syntactic nature of these principles sets Gentner's theory apart from her 
colleagues' theories. For Gentner, neither the goal state of the individual nor the relative 
importance of the domain information is pertinent to the mapping process. In other words, 
Gentner argues that scientists "draw" analogies in accordance with these six principles regardless 
of audience or purpose. 
Gentner's structure mapping theory of analogy is "microscopic" in the sense that it treats 
analogy not as a fundamental device that operates in a collective way but as a composite of 
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analogical correspondences in which each correspondence has the potential to operate 
autonomously. This focus on analogical correspondences rather than on analogy as a whole 
provides a much improved "resolving power" for rhetorical studies of analogy. It enables a 
detailed examination of the role of each constituent correspondence in a given scientific context 
and provides a sufficiently refined technical vocabulary by which to describe the results. To this 
end, I offer my own analysis of the role of analogical reasoning in Nagaoka's Saturnian theory of 
atomic structure in the following section. 
An Analysis of Nagaoka's Saturnian Theory of Atomic Structure 
The turn of the 20th century arguably represents the most fruitful period in the history of 
modern physics, and nowhere did these remarkable achievements shed more light than on our 
understanding of the structure of the atom. By the last half of the nineteenth century, the 
development of such programs as organic and physical chemistry, the kinetic theory of gases, 
and modern spectroscopy firmly entrenched the atomic hypothesis within the foundation of 
modern physical science (Heilbron, 1964, 1). But the cardinal discoveries of the 1890s—X-rays, 
radioactivity, the Zeeman effect, and the electron—simultaneously demanded that our 
conception of the atom be fundamentally revised. Between 1897, when J. J. Thomson discovered 
the electron, and 1913, when Niels Bohr advanced the first quantum-mechanical theory of 
atomic structure, the atom was shown to be not simply the "hard massy sphere" of Newton's day 
(atomos in the Greek sense) but a dynamic system of still smaller positively and negatively 
charged particles describable only through a bold synthesis of classical and quantum mechanics 
(Conn and Turner, 1965, 16; French and Taylor, 1978, 27). 
To account successfully for visible natural phenomena in terms of an invisible atomic 
structure was an exercise not only in mathematical rigor but also in creative thinking, for in the 
early 1900s neither the nature of positive electricity nor the mechanism responsible for spectral 
emissions was known, the cause of atomic weight was a still mystery, and the intensity of the 
line spectrum had yet to be studied (Yagi, 1964, 29); spectroscopic data, however precise, proved 
inconclusive for questions of the size of the atom, of radiation collapse, and of the motion of the 
electron (Heilbron, 1964, 112). Thus, the remarkable achievements of the recent past created 
little constraint over early theory construction, permitting physicists an unusually wide variety of 
candidate hypotheses (and personal predilections) from which to attempt their solutions to the 
question of atomic structure. 
Such was the setting for Hantaro Nagaoka on December 5, 1903, when he unveiled his 
Saturnian theory of atomic structure before the Physico-Mathematical Society of Tokyo. In 
essence, Nagaoka drew via analogy from Maxwell's Adam's Prize-winning essay, "On the 
Stability of the Motion of Saturn's Rings," to propose an atomic system that accounted for alpha 
and beta radioactivity and "whose small oscillations accord qualitatively with the regularity 
observed in the spectra of different elements and by which the influence of the magnetic field on 
band- and line-spectra is easily explicable" (1904, 445). 
Nagaoka acknowledged his debt to Maxwell in his first paper on atomic structure, "Kinetics 
of a System of Particles Illustrating the Line and Band Spectrum and the Phenomena of 
Radioactivity": 
The system, which I am going to discuss, consists of a large number of particles of equal 
mass arranged in a circle at equal angular intervals and repelling each other with forces 
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inversely proportional to the square of distance; at the centre of the circle, place a particle 
of large mass attracting the other particles according to the same law of force. If these 
repelling particles be revolving with nearly the same velocity about the attracting centre, 
the system will generally remain stable, for small disturbances, provided the attracting 
force be sufficiently great. The system differs from the Saturnian system considered by 
Maxwell in having repelling particles instead of attracting satellites. (Nagaoka, 1904, 
445) 
By reasoning by analogy, Nagaoka superimposed the dynamic system of Saturn and its rings 
onto the structure of his "ideal atom," creating a "quasi-stable" atomic model containing 
electrons in dynamic equilibria whose displacement accounted qualitatively for the regularity of 
spectral emissions. The orthogonal orientation of the displacements about their dynamic 
equilibria enabled Nagaoka to account for the apparent fact that line spectra and not band spectra 
are influenced by magnetic fields, a phenomenon known as the Zeeman effect. And the high-
velocity, quasi-stable particles provided a straightforward account for alpha and beta 
radioactivity. 
Nagaoka's system differs from Maxwell's "in having repelling particles instead of attracting 
satellites": Maxwell's is a gravitational system, whereas Nagaoka's is an electrical, though not an 
electrically neutral, one. Accordingly, Nagaoka replaced the gravitational force of Maxwell's 
system with its electrical analog, Coulomb force, and neglected the magnetic component (Schott, 
1904, 437). Charge replaced mass as the salient property of the system, but the mechanisms 
through which Nagaoka explained atomic spectral emissions, the Zeeman effect, stability, and 
radioactivity remained intact. 
Structural Consistency 
Gentner et al. (1997, 6) define a structurally consistent correspondence as "one that satisfies 
the [limitations] of parallel connectivity and one-to-one mapping." Parallel connectivity 
stipulates that the objects of corresponding predicates must also correspond; that is, they must 
hold as analogically synonymous throughout any subsequent inferential frameworks. For 
example, if the base domain predicate BETRAYED (Judas, Jesus) corresponds to the target 
domain predicate BETRAYED (Claudius, King), then parallel connectivity requires that Judas 
correspond to Claudius and that Jesus correspond to King (and vice versa). Thus, the phrase 
"Claudius was the Judas of Denmark" makes sense while the phrase "Claudius was the Jesus of 
Denmark" does not. 
One-to-one mapping adds a further limitation: Not only must objects of corresponding 
predicates correspond, they must do so exclusively, which is to say, in a more general manner, 
that each object of a domain must correspond to no more than one object of another domain. An 
analogy that introduces an inconsistent predicate, such as BETRAYED (Gertrude, King), 
preserves parallel connectivity but sacrifices one-to-one mapping for now Judas may be mapped 
to Claudius or Gertrude.   
  A more widely cited example of this sort of structural inconsistency may be found in the 
prose of the alchemists. In his Collection des Anciens Alchemistes Grecs, Bertholet translates a 
section of a tenth or eleventh century manuscript written by St. Mark to describe the 
metaphysical symbolism frequently assigned to the egg: "The egg has been called the seed and 
its shell the skin; its white and its yellow the flesh, its oily part, the soul, its aqueous, the breath 
of the air" (qtd. in Gentner and Jeziorski, 1993, 465). When confronted with such 
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inconsistencies, "alchemists resolved the tension by combining both interpretations into a fused 
whole" rather than choosing a singular interpretation comprised of one-to-one correspondences, 
and it is precisely this failure to preserve one-to-one correspondences, according to Gentner and 
Jeziorski (1993, 465), that sharply differentiates the alchemical norm from the modern scientific 
norm in terms of legitimate analogical reasoning. 
In Nagaoka's case, the Saturnian analogy rests almost exclusively upon two fundamental 
object correspondences: Saturn to the positive central particle and Saturn's satellites to the 
negative electrons. These two object correspondences are embedded in virtually every predicate 
correspondence of Nagaoka's framework, including: 
REVOLVE AROUND (satellites, Saturn) 
REVOLVE AROUND (electrons, central particle) 
DISTANCE (Saturn, satellites) 
DISTANCE (central particle, electrons) 
ATTRACTS (Saturn, satellites) 
ATTRACTS (central particle, electrons) 
DISPLACES (external force, satellites) 
DISPLACES (external force, electrons) 
VARIES INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL [D2 (Saturn, satellites), ATTRACTS (Saturn, 
satellites)] 
VARIES INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL [D2 (central particle, electrons), ATTRACTS 
(central particle, electrons)] 
For parallel connectivity to exist in the Saturnian analogy, there must be no mixed matching 
of objects: At no time in Nagaoka's theory can electrons inherit analogically from Saturn, nor can 
the central particle inherit from Saturn's satellites (and vice versa). For one-to-one mapping to 
exist, not only must the central particle and electrons inherit from Saturn and its satellites 
respectively, they must do so exclusively with no extraneous mappings. For example, Nagaoka's 
analogy cannot attribute an orbital motion to the central particle (a breach of parallel 
connectivity), require electrons to take on a positive charge (a breach of parallel connectivity), or 
map Saturn's gravitational force to more than one object in the atomic domain (a breach of one-
to-one mapping). 
As one might suspect, the Saturnian analogy breaches neither parallel connectivity nor one-
to-one mapping. Structural consistency does exist in Nagaoka's case, for nowhere does he rely 
upon mixed matches or one-to-multiple mappings in his theory. 
He opens his "Kinetics" paper of 1904 by sketching his Saturnian theory of atomic structure, 
after which he contrasts it to Maxwell's celestial system: "The [Saturnian atomic] system differs 
from the Saturnian system considered by Maxwell in having repelling particles instead of 
attracting satellites. The present case will evidently be approximately realized if we replace these 
satellites by negative electrons and the attracting centre by a positively charged particle" (1904, 
445; his emphasis). He then maintains these parallel object correspondences throughout the 
entire framework of his theory. His Larmorian treatment of radiation collapse demonstrates 
parallel connectivity on the issue of charge; never, for example, is the attractive force between 
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electrons assigned elsewhere. Moreover, the Saturnian analogy invariably maintains a one-to-one 
correspondence between gravitational attraction in the celestial domain and electrical attraction 
in the atomic domain, as demonstrated by Nagaoka's equation for the frequency of transversal 
oscillations. 
Structural consistency is also preserved in Nagaoka's explanation of the Zeeman effect 
(1904, 450) and of alpha and beta radioactivity (1904, 454), for both accounts necessarily 
suppose a positively charged central particle surrounded by negatively charged, orbiting 
electrons. At no time does Nagaoka draw from the Saturnian analogy in a way that breaches 
parallel connectivity or one-to-one mapping. 
Relational Focus and Systematicity 
The two most defining principles of Gentner's structure mapping theory of analogy are its 
focus on relational correspondences and its emphasis on the level of the systematicity among 
them. "Relational focus" refers to Gentner's claim that "analogy is characterized by the mapping 
of relations between objects, rather than attributes of objects, from the base to the target" (1983, 
168); hence, the term structure mapping. For example, the phrase "Claudius was the Judas of 
Denmark" implies a relational correspondence between Claudius and Judas involving betrayal: 
BETRAYED (Judas, Jesus) 
BETRAYED (Claudius, King) 
The relationship between Judas and Jesus is the salient property, not the particular attributes 
of Judas or Jesus, such as hair color or weight. That Christians believe Jesus to be the son of God 
is entirely irrelevant to the interpretation of the phrase because such attributes, according to 
Gentner, are discarded under modern norms of analogical reasoning. 
Within the realm of relational correspondences, systematicity further limits the mapping 
process by proposing that those correspondences that belong to mutually interconnected 
relationships are more likely to be imported than isolated ones. "Thus," explain Gentner et al. 
(1997, 6), "the probability that an individual match will be included in the final interpretation of 
a comparison is greater if it is connected by higher order relations to a common system of 
predicates." 
Nagaoka's use of the Saturnian analogy affirms Gentner's principle of relational focus, for he 
draws only from correspondences of a relational nature to corroborate his view of the atom, most 
notably: 
REVOLVE AROUND (satellites, Saturn) 
DISTANCE (Saturn, satellites) 
ATTRACTS (Saturn, satellites) 
DISPLACES (external force, satellites) 
VARIES INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL [D2 (Saturn, satellites), ATTRACTS (Saturn, 
satellites)] 
Object attributes from the celestial domain, such as YELLOW (Saturn), HOT (Saturn), 
PLANET (Saturn), SPHERICAL (Saturn), or HARD (satellites), play no role in Nagaoka's 
theory. One object attribute, CHARGED (electron), does present a significant obstacle for 
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Nagaoka in terms of radiation collapse, but it is entirely a feature of the atomic domain and not 
imported from the celestial domain during Nagaoka's interpretation of the Saturnian analogy. 
Indeed, relations do have priority over object attributes in Nagaoka's use of the Saturnian 
analogy. 
Gentner's notion of systematicity plausibly explains why relational correspondences such as 
DISTANCE (Saturn, satellites) and ATTRACTS (Saturn, satellites) were mapped to the atomic 
domain while other relational correspondences such as HOTTER THAN (Saturn, satellites) and 
BRIGHTER THAN (Saturn, satellites) were not. For Gentner, DISTANCE and ATTRACTS 
belong to a system of coherent, mutually constraining relationships that imbues them with a 
higher probability of mapping: DISTANCE (Saturn, satellites) and ATTRACTS (Saturn, 
satellites) are fundamentally interconnected by the law of gravitational attraction operating in the 
celestial domain. Neither HOTTER THAN (Saturn, satellites) nor BRIGHTER THAN (Saturn, 
satellites) operate within such a higher order relation; consequently, they are less likely to be 
imported by an analogy. 
Higher-order relations are also effected by higher-order predicates, such as CAUSE, which 
provide their subordinate predicates with a higher level of systematicity and therefore a higher 
probability of mapping. In Nagaoka's case, the Saturnian analogy imports to the target domain 
two correspondences (among others), ATTRACTS (central particle, electron) and REVOLVE 
AROUND (electrons, central particle), between which exists a higher-order causal relationship: 
CAUSE [ATTRACTS (central particle, electrons), REVOLVE AROUND (electrons, 
central particle)] 
For Gentner, this relationship increases the level of coherency and systematicity between the 
two correspondences (in the same way that the law of gravitation interconnects the DISTANCE 
and ATTRACTS correspondences), explaining, in part, why the two correspondences are 
mapped preferentially by Nagaoka over similar relational correspondences. 
At no time does Nagaoka draw from the Saturnian analogy in a way that breaches Gentner's 
relational focus and systematicity principles. 
No Extraneous Associations 
Another feature of modern analogical reasoning, according to Gentner and Jeziorski (1993, 
450), is its disregard for extraneous associations. Only commonalities between the target and 
base lend credence to the strength of an analogy. For example, that the sun and planets are 
composed of atoms does not strengthen Rutherford's solar system model of the atom, for 
thematic associations are irrelevant in modern analogical reasoning. 
Nagaoka's use of the Saturnian analogy supports Gentner and Jeziorski's claim, for nowhere 
does he draw from extraneous Saturnian associations. In the opening of his paper, he introduces 
the Saturnian model as a tenable theory of atomic structure: 
The system, which I am going to discuss, consists of a large number of particles of equal 
mass arranged in a circle at equal angular intervals and repelling each other with forces 
inversely proportional to the square of distance; at the centre of the circle, place a particle 
of large mass attracting the other particles according to the same law of force. If these 
repelling particles be revolving with nearly the same velocity about the attracting centre, 
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the system will generally remain stable, for small disturbances, provided the attracting 
force be sufficiently great. (1904, 445) 
Afterwards, to preclude his audience from potentially mapping ATTRACT (satellites, 
satellites) from the celestial to the atomic domain, Nagaoka highlights the salient difference 
between his and Maxwell's system: "The system differs from the Saturnian system considered by 
Maxwell in having repelling particles instead of attracting satellites" (1904, 445). He then 
proceeds to develop his theory using only the commonalities that lie therein. For example, his 
mathematical approach to the equations of motion for wave disturbances comes directly from 
Maxwell, involving, at most, the DISPLACES correspondence of the Saturnian analogy.  
Were the setting for Nagaoka's theory that of medieval times, the notion that Saturn is the 
"ruler of life," combined with the belief that all life is composed of atoms, would have lent 
substantial credence to a Saturnian view of atomic theory (Cavendish, 1967, 27). But it is 
precisely this sort of extraneous association that is missing from Nagaoka's theory, which places 
it in accordance with the modern norm of analogical reasoning as described by Gentner.  
No Mixed Analogies 
Not only did Nagaoka refrain from drawing from extraneous Saturnian associations, he also 
refrained from drawing analogies from any base domain other than the Saturnian celestial 
system. This satisfies Gentner's fifth principle of modern analogical reasoning, which stipulates 
that the "relational network to be mapped should be entirely contained within one base domain. 
When two bases are used, they should each convey a coherent system" (Gentner and Jeziorski, 
1993, 450). "In inferential reasoning," explain Gentner and Jeziorski (1993, 450), "[scientists] 
prefer that the relational system mapped onto a target be drawn from a single base domain". 
For Nagaoka, the single base domain was that which Maxwell created in his 1856 essay on 
the rings of Saturn, and the entirety of Nagaoka's base domain from which he draws analogically 
lies therein. 
Analogy Is Not Causation 
"That two phenomena are analogous," write Gentner and Jeziorski, "does not imply that one 
causes the other" (1993, 450). This last principle of Gentner's theory of analogy is a rather 
unremarkable claim: although instances of causation may exist in the base domain and be 
legitimately imported to the target domain, instances of causation may not span the base and 
target domain in modern analogical reasoning. 
Although causal relations do operate within his base domain and increase the probability of 
mapping for certain correspondences, at no time does Nagaoka imply a causal relation from the 
celestial to the atomic domain. For Nagaoka, in stark contrast to his alchemical ancestors, 
analogy is not causation. 
Implications for Rhetoric of Science 
A question still remains: What are the implications for rhetoric of science? In this section, I 
take advantage of the "microscopic" nature of Gentner's theory and do something that no 
rhetorician has done: I examine the varying levels of constraint imposed upon Nagaoka by the 
individual correspondence that constitute the analogy. I begin with the most constraining 
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correspondence and proceed to the least constraining to show that the Saturnian analogy as a 
whole did not influence Nagaoka in any collective way. Instead, the individual correspondences 
constrained Nagaoka to varying degrees on different issues, including nuclear compatibility, the 
nature of electricity, radiation collapse, spectral phenomena, and alpha and beta radioactivity, 
functioning sometimes as an asset to his argument and other times as a serious liability. 
The Strong Constraint of REVOLVE AROUND 
Of all of the correspondences mapped in the Saturnian analogy, REVOLVE AROUND 
(electrons, central particle) rests most firmly at the foundation of Nagaoka's theory of atomic 
structure. Once imported to the atomic domain, this predicate requires a spatial scaffolding that 
strongly constrained Nagaoka in three ways: It required him to posit the existence of electrons, of 
a central particle, and of a particular spatial relationship between them, namely that the former 
revolve around the latter in dynamic equilibria. 
That the REVOLVE AROUND correspondence constrained Nagaoka by requiring him to 
posit the existence of the electron was a trivial concern, for not only had J. J. Thomson already 
discovered the electron, he had also shown it to be a constituent of all matter and therefore 
indigenous to all atoms. In this case, although the correspondence strongly constrained Nagaoka, 
it did so to an unremarkable end: the reaffirmation of the only tenable position any scientist 
could have taken at the time. 
That the REVOLVE AROUND correspondence constrained Nagaoka by requiring him to 
posit the existence of a central particle, however, sharply separated him from his colleagues on 
two crucial issues: one that would become known as nuclear compatibility, the other having to 
do with the nature of electricity. Until Rutherford's 1911 discovery of the nucleus, a wide variety 
of competing structural hypotheses (in addition to Nagaoka's) abounded, including those 
advanced by Thomson, Jeans, Rayleigh, and Schott. To account for electrical stability, each 
scientist introduced a unique conception of positive charge to counterbalance the negative charge 
of electrons. But none chose to envision the positive charge in the form of a central particle. 
None except Nagaoka. But for him, it was not a matter of "choice," and this is a point about 
agency worth making: Whereas the others enjoyed more creative freedom in formulating their 
conceptions of positive charge, Nagaoka was constrained by the REVOLVE AROUND 
correspondence to acknowledge a central particle and consequently to place the positive charge 
therein. It was not that the correspondence suggested to Nagaoka a central particle approach; 
rather, it required it. Accordingly, in 1904 the Japanese physicist stood as the sole public 
exponent of a central particle theory of atomic structure, providing the only theory of the time 
compatible with the discovery of the nucleus in 1911. Thus, Nagaoka's subscription to the 
Saturnian analogy constrained him in a noteworthy way: it placed him in opposition to Thomson, 
Jeans, Rayleigh, and Schott on what would become known as the issue of nuclear compatibility. 
Not only did the REVOLVE AROUND correspondence constrain Nagaoka to a nuclear 
compatible theory of atomic structure, it also constrained him to a material interpretation of 
electricity. Like Saturn and its satellites, the correspondence requires the constituents of the atom 
to be viewed as separate, rigid bodies influenced by forces acting at a distance. Because 
Thomson had long since shown the electron to possess the negative charge, Nagaoka quite 
naturally ascribed to the central particle the positive charge, which in turn implied that not only 
negative but also positive electricity is corpuscular in nature and fundamental to atomic 
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processes. Again, it was not that the correspondence suggested a material interpretation of 
electricity; rather, it required it: while maintaining his subscription to the Saturnian analogy, 
Nagaoka could not have argued otherwise. Again, Nagaoka found himself in opposition to 
Thomson, who had hoped to explain the positive charge as a manifestation of interactions among 
negative charges, leaving the electron as the sole fundamental unit of electricity. 
Moreover, the material interpretation required by the correspondence precluded the notion 
of point-mass particles and therefore denies the idea of interpenetrability of electricity. (For how 
could one imagine material bodies—celestial or atomic—passing through one another with 
ease?) For Nagaoka, this was a fortunate constraint. Unlike Thomson, in whose atomic model 
electrons float freely within a sphere of positive electricity, Nagaoka had rejected the notion of 
interpenetrability of positive and negative electricity on pre-theoretical grounds (Yagi, 1967, 23; 
Yagi, 1972, 87): "It is difficult to imagine that electrons move so freely in a positively charged 
sphere of the atom as if each electron were a geometrical point" (Yagi, 1964, 33). Thus, at a time 
when empirical data on the nature of electricity proved inconclusive and physicists turned to 
other means of support, the constraint effected by the Saturnian analogy served as an asset to 
Nagaoka: it enabled him to argue from analogy as a means by which to support his a priori view 
of electricity in the absence of experimental evidence. 
That the REVOLVE AROUND correspondence requires electrons to orbit the central 
particle in dynamic equilibrium served as one of the most troublesome constraints of the 
Saturnian analogy, for it forced Nagaoka to confront the inevitable collapse of his Saturnian 
atom from perpetual loss of energy, a phenomenon known as radiation collapse. This explains in 
part why no one but Nagaoka chose to adopt a central particle theory of atomic structure before 
1911. 
Radiation collapse follows from the REVOLVE AROUND correspondence in conjunction 
with three subordinate correspondences imported by the Saturnian analogy: 
DISTANCE (central particle, electron) 
ATTRACTS (central particle, electron) 
VARIES INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL [D2 (central particle, electrons), ATTRACTS 
(central particle, electrons)] 
Together, these four correspondences impose a particular order on the atom, analogous to 
Saturn and its satellites, that required Nagaoka to acknowledge the existence of an attractive 
force between the central particle and the electrons that varies inversely proportional to the 
square of their separation distance. In the celestial domain, Maxwell attributed this force to 
gravitational attraction. But in the atomic domain, where charge replaces mass as the salient 
property of the particles, Nagaoka predictably accounted for the attractive force by way of 
electrical attraction. (In his theory, Nagaoka neglected magnetic forces as well as the mutual 
repulsion among electrons.) 
Such a system would be stable (and is indeed stable in the celestial domain), if it were not 
for one attribute of the electron, well known by 1904: 
CHARGED (electron) 
Unlike the satellites of Saturn, the electron possesses a charge, which, in conjunction with 
the four imported correspondences above, requires that it perpetually radiate energy. Given the 
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backdrop of classical physics, the electrons would eventually spiral inward, collapsing the atom 
upon itself until it disintegrated. 
Owing to his subscription to the Saturnian analogy, Nagaoka was unable to ignore this 
debilitating problem: He attempted a solution by drawing from the 1897 work of Larmor, who 
argued that the radiation loss of an unexcited atom would be negligible if the system were 
harmonized in such a way that the mean value of the accelerations of the electrons remained at 
zero. Accordingly, Nagaoka set himself to the task of showing that his Saturnian system is 
harmonized in such a fashion, which hinges on the point that 2U-V assumes oscillating values 
about zero, where U is the total energy of the system and V is the potential energy. He concluded 
with haste and in a rather circular fashion: 
Thus 2U-V will assume oscillating values, when rk and rkl are subject to small 
disturbances, provided the quantities e, E, and wkyk and the mean values of rk and rkl are 
such that 2U-V assumes oscillating values, sometimes exceeding and sometimes falling 
short of zero. (1904, 446) 
Apparently, Nagaoka's solution was to his satisfaction—but to his satisfaction alone. That 
2U-V assumes oscillating values does not entail the permanent stability of the atom. Moreover, 
his argument does not hold for the common case of one electron. Thus, his Larmorian treatment 
was seen as an unsuccessful solution, and the radiation collapse problem continued to plague his 
Saturnian atom for the remainder of its life. However, Nagaoka was not hampered as much as 
one might think, perhaps because his primary purpose, as the opening of his "Kinetics" paper 
states, was to provide a qualitative account of spectral phenomena and a mechanical analogy of 
radioactivity, two areas in which the constraints of the Saturnian analogy served him well. 
The Weak Constraint of DISPLACES 
The Saturnian analogy also served a more traditional role as a heuristic device for Nagaoka, 
suggesting to him potential avenues for fruitful inquiry into the innerworkings of the atom. It is 
in this capacity of "weaker" constraint, where the balance of agency lay in his corner, that 
Nagaoka found it most useful, for it provided him with a qualitative account of spectral 
emissions as well as a convenient means by which to account for the Zeeman effect and alpha 
and beta radioactivity. 
The Saturnian analogy served in this capacity through the DISPLACES correspondence set, 
which is a composite of three related correspondences (Maxwell, 1983, 93): 
DISPLACES RADIALLY (external force, electron) 
DISPLACES ANGULARLY (external force, electron) 
DISPLACES NORMALLY (external force, electron) 
It was from the heuristic value of DISPLACES NORMALLY and DISPLACES 
ANGULARLY that Nagaoka found a qualitative account for band and line spectra respectively, 
and from the relative spatial relationship between the correspondences that he found a 
geometrical account for the Zeeman effect. 
Once imported to the atomic domain, the correspondence set defines the manner in which an 
electron may be displaced from dynamic equilibrium when influenced by an external force. In 
doing so, the correspondence set imports to the atomic domain three degrees of freedom for 
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electronic motion. (If this seems a trivial point, recall that there were several mechanical 
analogies of the era that imported different degrees of freedom to their respective domains. Max 
Planck's conception of a perfect radiator in terms of single harmonic oscillators is a good 
example of an analogy that imports one degree of freedom to the atomic domain.) Because 
electronic motion was believed to be the source of spectral phenomena, Nagaoka saw each 
degree of freedom (radial, angular, and normal) as a potential mechanical explanation for such 
phenomena. Accordingly, he framed his questions of atomic spectroscopy in terms of sets of 
equations of electronic motion in the radial, angular, and normal directions and attempted to 
deduce from them a spectroscopic law, such as Balmer's or Deslandres's, grounded in empirical 
backing of three decades of research. 
It would be misleading to claim that the DISPLACES correspondence set required Nagaoka 
to search for a mechanical explanation of spectral emissions within the three degrees of freedom 
it set forth, for unlike the REVOLVE AROUND correspondence, which required Nagaoka to 
posit the existence of the central particle, the DISPLACES correspondence set simply suggested 
three potential sources of explanation for spectral phenomena. It did not require that he pursue 
them. 
Nevertheless, Nagaoka chose to follow the path sketched by the DISPLACES 
correspondence set by investigating the spectral implications of radial, angular, and normal 
displacements of electrons about their dynamic equilibria in search of a qualitative account for 
spectral phenomena. Radial displacement had little to offer in the way of spectroscopic 
implications. But from the equation of motion of normal displacement, Nagaoka deduced the 
frequency of transversal electronic oscillation, the spectroscopic significance of which he 
immediately recognized:  
For small values of h, n' lie very near each other, but as h increases, the interval gradually 
becomes larger and ultimately reaches a maximum. The interval between successive 
frequencies decreases as h is increased. Constructing the frequency lines as functions of 
h, we find a close resemblance with the band-spectrum. . . . In fact, the above equation is 
but an extension of Deslandres' empirical formula in a slightly altered form. . . . (1904, 
449; my emphasis). 
In other words, by supposing a sufficiently large number of electrons in a ring, Nagaoka 
realized that his frequency equation for normal oscillation produced a graph that accorded 
qualitatively with the wealth of band spectra evidence amassed. Moreover, by adding the lemma 
h=ho-h', where ho represents the spectral line at the edge, the equation may be rewritten as "one 
of the empirical formulae used by Kayser and Runge in the discussion of the cyanogen band" 
(Nagaoka 1904, 450). 
Similarly, from the angular equation of motion, Nagaoka deduced the equation for angular 
frequency displacement of a particle around an attracting center, and again found promising 
spectroscopic implications: 
The frequency increases as h is increased, and the nature of the series shows that the 
spectral lines corresponding to these vibrations will gradually crowd together when h is 
large. The qualitative coincidence of the above result with the line-spectrum is at once 
evident, if h be not small. (1904, 451; my emphasis) 
Nagaoka interpreted these findings as more than coincidental; they represented tangible 
evidence for the veracity of his Saturnian theory of atomic structure, at least insofar as the theory 
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was able to account qualitatively for spectral emissions. Accordingly, in the Saturnian theory of 
atomic structure, displacement of electrons about their dynamic equilibria accounts for spectral 
emissions, with displacements parallel to the plane of revolution (in the angular direction) 
responsible for line spectra and those normal to the plane responsible for band spectra. 
  That the normal and angular displacements are perpendicular to one another served as a 
geometrical convenience for Nagaoka, who utilized this spatial relationship to explain "that the 
Zeeman effect is only peculiar to the line-spectrum, while the band-spectrum is not affected by 
the magnetic force" (1904, 452). With the introduction of a magnetic field perpendicular to the 
plane of revolution, Nagaoka argued, comes a force that displaces the electrons radially—parallel 
to the plane of revolution; according to his equations of motion, these displacement waves 
propagate around the path of equilibrium at different velocities and are "circularly polarized in 
opposite sense" (1904, 452), which enabled him to account theoretically for two widely-known 
effects of a magnetic field on a spectral line: doublets and opposite polarity. Moreover, "[t]he 
magnetic field perpendicular to the plane of the orbit does not affect the transverse vibrators 
[perpendicular to the plane]," which corresponds with the experimental fact that band spectra are 
immune to magnetic influence (1904, 452).  
If a magnetic field is introduced parallel to the plane of revolution, then the force 
responsible for displacing an electron from its dynamic equilibrium is perpendicular to the plane 
of revolution and, vital to Nagaoka's argument, harmonic (1904, 452). Although the equation 
may take on an infinite number of individual values oscillating with a finite range, their net 
effect (mean value) is zero. Therefore, the introduction of a magnetic field parallel to the plane of 
revolution produces "no sensible effect" on the period of normal oscillations responsible for band 
spectra (1904, 452). Thus, the relative spatial orientation of the correspondences suggested to 
Nagaoka a convenient mechanical means by which to account for the Zeeman effect and 
consequently enabled him to propose a credible atomic system "whose small oscillations accord 
qualitatively with the regularity observed in the spectra of different elements and by which the 
influence of the magnetic field on band- and line-spectra is easily explicable" (1904, 445). 
Nagaoka's conception of electronic displacement played a role not only in his account of 
spectral phenomena but also in his account of radioactivity. Drawing directly on Maxwell's 
investigation of the mutual displacement of neighboring Saturnian rings, Nagaoka argued that for 
every spectral series there exists a corresponding ring of electrons, "all of which may or may not 
lie in the same plane" (1904, 453). Because of the close proximity of these rings, electronic 
displacement in one ring may propagate through neighboring rings and produce unstable modes 
of vibration in the atom, a prospect that fueled Schott's harsh criticism of the Saturnian atom in 
the pages of the Philosophical Magazine. However, Nagaoka utilized the "quasi-stability" of the 
Saturnian atom to mechanically account for alpha and beta radioactivity in terms of dynamically 
unstable Saturnian atoms and their subsequent dispersal of central particles and accompanying 
electrons. In particular, he demonstrated mathematically that the more massive the ring, the 
greater the disturbance (1904, 454). Accordingly, in heavier atoms, electronic displacements may 
produce situations in which the 
motion of the ring will . . . acquire such an amplitude as to break the ring. In this case, the 
particles will fly away with enormous velocities, and the central particle will participate 
in the same motion, owing to the law of conservation of the centre of mass. If the 
particles be supposed to be negative electrons, they will disperse in various directions 
with great velocities, and the positively charged particle at the centre will also fly off. 
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Here we have arrived at a mechanical analogy, which explains the production of [alpha] 
and [beta] rays by the disintegration of the ideal atom. (Nagaoka, 1904, 454) 
Thus, Nagaoka attempted to redeem the structural instability housed within the Saturnian 
analogy by framing it as a plausible mechanical explanation not only of alpha and beta 
radioactivity but also of the higher occurrence of radioactivity in the heavier elements. 
At this point, the strength of constraint between the Saturnian analogy and Nagaoka's 
account of radioactivity is very weak, very marginal, and that is precisely my point: not that the 
DISPLACES correspondence set served an immense heuristic role for Nagaoka, constraining 
him in definable ways as he developed his account of radioactivity, but that it subtly suggested to 
him a mechanical account of radioactivity based on Maxwell's treatment of the mutual influence 
of neighboring Saturnian rings. 
In summary, the Saturnian analogy did not influence Nagaoka in a collective way. Instead, 
the constituent correspondences of the analogy constrained Nagaoka to varying degrees on 
different issues, functioning sometimes as an asset to his argument and other times as a liability. 
As an asset, the analogy demanded a central particle theory of atomic structure, which positioned 
Nagaoka (we see in retrospect) as the sole physicist to foreshadow Rutherford's 1911 discovery 
of the nucleus. In its requirement of a material interpretation of electricity, the analogy enabled 
Nagaoka to support his a priori view of electricity in the absence of experimental evidence. It 
also suggested three potential sources of explanation for spectral emissions and the Zeeman 
effect and, finally, provided a straightforward account of alpha and beta radioactivity. As a 
liability, the analogy entailed the problem of radiation collapse, which, despite Nagaoka's 
Larmorian solution, persisted as the fatal flaw of the Saturnian theory of atomic structure. 
Conclusion 
What I am suggesting is that Gentner's six principles of analogical reasoning provide a 
methodologically rigorous, or contestable, matrix to be used in conjunction with textual analysis 
as a fruitful means by which to begin to investigate sociocultural variation in analogical 
reasoning and its subsequent rhetorical effect. No longer confined to discussing how analogy 
might operate collectively and universally, rhetoricians of science may begin to perceive 
analogical activity through a methodological lens of improved resolution: through structural 
consistency, which separates to some degree the traditionally medieval scientific cultures from 
the traditionally modern; through relational focus, which may or may not admit of cultural 
variation; through systematicity, which seems to vary with respect to the intellectual maturity of 
the discipline in question (e.g., early to modern cell biology in terms of increased 
mathematicization and its effects on appropriate reasoning processes); through extraneous and 
mixed correspondences; and through causation, which seems to separate to some degree 
alchemical reasoning practices from what is traditionally considered the modern Western norm 
in science. 
Put another way, I am suggesting an alternative to universal idealizations of cognitive 
processes, such as syllogistic and analogical reasoning, by way of Vygotsky's and Gentner's 
theoretical and methodological guidance. This paper is my attempt to explicate and exemplify 
that alternative. 
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